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WILLIAM K. CALLAHAN, 
Respondent/Appellee, 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
The Appellee, William K. Callahan, pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, submits this Brief on appeal. 
Jurisdiction 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-
3(2)(h) 1953, as amended. The order appealed from is a final order dismissing the Petition 
to Modify the Decree of Divorce of Appellant. 
Case No. 990051-CA 
Priority 15 
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STATUTES 
Uniform Services Former Spouses' Protection Act, (hereinafter USFSPA), codified as 
10 USC 1401 § 1041 et. seq. (between June 26, 1981 and February 1, 1983) 2 
Utah R. Civ. P. 59, 60(b) 7 
iii 
Issues on Appeal 
Did the trial court correctly rule that a change in law is not a change of circumstances 
which permits a trial court to reopen and reconsider the provisions of a Decree of Divorce. 
Did the trial court err in denying Appellee his costs and attorney's fees. 
Statement of Case 
At the time the parties were divorced, no military retirement had been accumulated 
by the Appellee and no order was made regarding Appellee's rights to any military 
retirement. The Decree of Divorce entered March 10, 1982 (R. 51) which was during the 
"gap" period that is, after the decision of McCarty v. McCarty. 453 U.S. 210 (1981) and 
before enactment of the Uniform Services Former Spouses' Protection Act, (hereinafter 
USFSPA), codified as 10 USC 1401 § 1041 et. seq. (between June 26, 1981 and February 
1, 1983). Under the provisions of the USFSPA, states were empowered to provide for the 
division of accumulated military retirement, however, actual division decisions were left as 
discretionary with the state courts. 
This Court in Throckmorton v. Throckmorton. 767 P.2d 121 (Utah App. 1988) 
ruled that a change in the law (permitting division of retirement accounts) enacted after the 
entry of the Decree of Divorce was not a material change of circumstance that would permit 
the reopening of a Decree of Divorce to consider division of retirement accounts. In Toone 
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v. Toone. 952 P.2d 112 (Utah App. 1998) this Court specifically ruled that enactment of 
USFSPA, which permitted the divisions of military retirement benefits after February 1, 
1983, was as the Court had previously ruled in Throckmorton, not a material change in 
circumstances that would permit the reopening of the Decree. Consequently, the trial court 
correctly granted Appellee's Motion To Dismiss the Petition of the Appellant to permit her 
to reopen the Decree of Divorce and divide the military retirement, which was accumulated 
by Appellee after the entry of the Decree of Divorce. The fact that the decree was entered 
during the gap period is legally insignificant. 
Summary of Arguments 
Since Appellant pursued a clearly barred claim, her action is frivolous and pursued 
in bad faith. Consequently, the trial court should have awarded Appellee his costs and 
attorney fees under Allred v. Allred. 807 P.2d 350 (Utah App. 1991). 
Utah law clearly provides that a change in the law permitting division of retirement 
benefits which could not be divided at the time of the entry the Decree is not a material 
change in circumstances which permit reopening the Decree to divide that asset at a later 
date. Toone v. Toone. 952 P.2d 112 (Utah App. 1998), Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 
767 P.2d 121 (Utah App. 1988). 
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Where the law is clear and an invalid claim is pursued, the action is frivolous and/or 
pursued in bad faith. Allred v. Allred. 807 P.2d 350 (Utah App. 1991) and Brigham City 
v. Mantuo Town. 754 P.2d 1230 (Utah App. 1988). 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED APPELLANT'S CLAIM 
AS A MATTER OF LAW FOR DIVISION OF MILITARY RETIREMENT 
ACCUMULATED AFTER THE DECREE OF DIVORCE BASED ON A 
CHANGE IN THE LAW WAS NOT A CLAIM RECOGNIZED UNDER UTAH 
LAW 
In this case, the trial court correctly ruled the decision of this Court in Toone v. 
Toone, 952 P.2d 112 (Utah App. 1998), governed the claim of the Appellant that she had a 
right to division of the Appellee's military retirement accumulated after the entry of the 
Decree of Divorce and dismissed that claim. In Toone. the final Decree of Divorce was 
entered after enactment of USFSPA. That is, after February 1, 1983. In this case, the decree 
was entered between the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in McCarty v. McCarty. 453 
U.S. 210 (1981), on June 26, 1981 and February 1, 1983, the effective date of the USFSPA, 
the "gap" period. This is legally insignificant under the principles articulated by this Court 
in Throckmorton v. Throckmorton. 767 P.2d 121 (Utah App. 1988), that is, a change in 
the law which permits division of retirement, which could not previously be divided, is not 
4 
a material change of circumstances permitting reopening of the Decree of Divorce. The only 
basis on which any military retirement rights accumulated by Respondent could have been 
divided after entry of the decree of divorce would have to be based on a change in the law. 
In this case, Appellant attempts to distinguish Toone v. Toone because it occurred 
after closure of the gap period, while Appellant's claim arose during the gap period. That 
is not a valid distinction and the trial court correctly rejected her contention. The ability to 
divide a military retirement during the gap period is permissive and as such, is even less 
mandatory a claim than one asserted after the gap period. 
In addition, there was no military retirement divisible at the time of the divorce. On 
the undisputed facts in this case, at the time the decree was entered, Appellee had served only 
thirteen (13) years in the military and he had been separated from the service for three years. 
(R. 57-58). Then, years after the parties were divorced the Appellee returned to reserve duty 
and commenced to accumulate the time credits necessary to secure a military retirement. (R. 
58). No retirement existed as of the date of the Decree of Divorce. 
In this case, prior to reaching the other equitable and legal defenses (e.g. latches and 
statute of limitations), the trial court correctly ruled that under these facts, Toone v. Toone. 
952 P.2d 112 (Utah App. 1998) required the Court to rule the Appellant's claim for a portion 
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of Respondent's military retirement was not valid. (R. 62-64). This Court's opinion in 
Toone very clearly states: 
"This court considered whether the recognition of a new legal right 
constitutes a change of circumstances sufficient to reopen a divorce decree in 
Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121 (Utah Ct.App.1998). In that 
case, a former wife sought to reopen the parties' 1976 divorce decree in order 
to obtain a share of her former spouse's civil retirement benefits. See id. at 
122. The wife claimed that although she was aware of the retirement account 
at the time of the divorce, she was unaware that she had any legal rights in it 
because at that time, Utah law did not recognize pension benefits as marital 
assets distributable upon divorce. See id. at 123. On appeal, the wife argued 
that the Utah Supreme Court's recognition of pension benefits as marital assets 
in Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431, 432-33 (Utah 1982) (holding trial 
court may consider "all of the parties' assets and circumstances, including 
retirement and pension rights" accrued during marriage, and may equitably 
distribute them in a divorce decree), constituted a substantial change of 
circumstances and precluded the application of res judicata. See 
Throckmorton, 767 P.2d at 123. 
This court disagreed and held that the subsequent legal recognition of 
a new property interest is not a substantial change of circumstances sufficient 
to override the "'compelling policy interest favoring the finality of property 
settlements.'" Id. At 124 (quoting Guffey v. LaChance, 127 Ariz. 140, 618 
P.2d 634, 636 (Ariz. Ct.App. 1980)). 
We believe the Throckmorton decision is controlling and precludes 
Parkhurst's claim of a substantial change of circumstances. She has failed to 
assert any change of circumstances other than her claim that the passage of 
USFSPA constitutes such a change. That enactment does not, under 
Throckmorton, constitute a substantial change sufficient to justify reopening 
the decree." 952 P.2d at 114. 
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Appellant turns to the next sentence in the Toone decision to attempt to distinguish 
it. That sentence provides: 
"Moreover, USFSPA was enacted and took effect before the Toone's divorce 
was finalized, so its passage does not properly constitute a "change" which has 
occurred since the divorce.1 
1
 Parkhurst admitted at oral argument that although she could have raised the 
issue of Toone's military retirement by filing a Rule 59 motion for new trial 
within ten days of entry of the final decree, or, alternatively, a Rule 60(b) 
motion for relief from judgment within three month after the decree was 
entered, she did not do so. See Utah R. Civ. P. 59, 60(b)." 952 P.2d at 114-
115. 
However, that is not a distinguishing feature as a matter of law, because the provisions 
of USFSPA are permissive, not mandatory. In addition, in this particular case, the Appellant 
sought modification of the decree in 1985, (R. 58) that is two years after enactment of 
USFSPA and did not request a modification as to the military retirement act at that time. 
By her statement of facts and the record in this case, it is clear that another thirteen 
years passed before Appellant returned to court seeking division of the military retirement. 
This makes her position weaker than Parkhurst's both because at the time of entry of the 
Decree of Divorce there was no retirement to be divided and because she returned to Court 
seeking a modification in the Decree of Divorce in 19854 after passage of USFSPA. There 
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is no valid basis on which to distinguish Toone or Throckmorton by simple reference to the 
gap period. 
THE APPELLEE SHOULD BE AWARDED HIS COSTS 
AND ATTORNEY'S FEES 
The trial court denied Appellee the attorney fees and costs he incurred in defending 
the Petition even as Judge Dutson believed this was a close case (R. 141-145). As pointed 
out above, under Toone v. Toone. supra., this is not a close case. This case presents a claim 
clearly barred by Throckmorton and Toone. The Appellant's claim is not one pursued in 
good faith. It is legally frivolous and Appellee should be awarded the costs and attorney fees 
he has incurred in defending this case, including this appeal. Allred v. Allred. 807 P.2d 350 
(Utah App. 1991). Brigham City v. Mantua Town. 754 P.2d 1230 (Utah App. 1988). 
CONCLUSION 
The decisions in Throckmorton and Toone completely bars Appellant's claim. She 
asserts to this court that based on the decision of this Court in Masters v. Worsley. 777 P.2d 
499 (Utah App. 1989), because she had no knowledge of the alleged facts supporting her 
claim she did not present it to the court and she should be allowed to proceed. That case 
involved a claim of fraud, not one that involved enactment of a federal statute of which 
Appellant is charged with knowledge. The statute was enacted two years prior to her return 
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to court in 1984. The trial court correctly ruled that Appellant's claim as not a valid claim 
in law under Toone v. Toone. supra, and granted the Appellant's Motion To Dismiss. This 
Court, following its own precedence in Toone and Throckmorton must affirm. In addition, 
the Court should award Appellee his attorney's fees based upon Appellant's frivolous bad 
faith pursuit of a clearly invalid claim. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /3 "~~day of _ ^ f ^ ^ / , 1999. 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
Attorney for Respondent/Appellee 
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